occur in a person's mind for us-as observers, students, and analysts-to contend that she or he is thinking politically, not artistically, sexually, or
tradition but it was not a history of the practice of political thought at its various levels of social articulation. And it then occurred to me that in studying
19
th century British liberalism we should temporarily forget about Mill if we wish to get acquainted with how a particular society thinks about politics. Mill was an abnormal liberal -far too good, too clever, too reflective, to permit us to explore the wide range of liberalism -the typical as well as the atypical; the good, the bad, and the awful. There were other crucial sources; pamphlets, newspapers, parliamentary debates, manifestos, popular books, literary works, minutes of meetings, and not least vernacular expressions, as well as the great minds of the age.
In stage two I turned to what I consider as the way in which actual political thought has always manifested itself-as particular and fluid conceptual combinations that, while contested, present themselves as uncontestable or decontested, and that aim at competing over the control of public political language. That was my expansive understanding of ideologies, readings of the political and social world, both deliberate and unintentional.
One central research question was: In which permutations did individuals and groups think about politics with a view to assisting or retarding change, approving or criticizing political arrangements? Even then, philosopher colleagues asked me: how can anyone produce good research based on inferior forms of political thinking? The best minds had always to engage with the best minds for high quality results to ensue.
A few years ago I moved to stage three, the product of which is my frequently appear clustered together in fluctuating family resemblance modes to which are given names such as liberalism, conservatism, or anarchism. That thinking takes place within contextualized semantic fields through which standard political concepts such as liberty, justice, or equality accrue meaning and directive force. Thinking about politics also contains strong moral and ethical elements-the desire for realizing a good or better society is a mainstay of human collective aspirations.
My current work, however, moves the object of interest on to a more elemental dimension: the practice of thinking politically itself. What are the thought-patterns to which the adjective 'political' can be allocated in a unique manner? Thinking politically is usually celebrated, analysed, and echoed in its general, stipulative, and occasionally bombastic registers such as 'justice is the first virtue of political institutions', 'man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains', 'we shall fight on the beaches . . . we shall never surrender', or 'the only thing we have to fear is fear itself '. These too are crucial expressions of political thinking-the first two voiced by eminent philosophers, the second two by eminent statesmen-but they tend to attract too much scholarly attention and respect at the expense of the multiverse of political discourse.
None of what I am about to say is a critique of political philosophy, which performs vital roles of ethical investigation and experimentation, analytical and logical fine-tuning, and the promotion of values thought by many to be crucially desirable, such as justice, democracy and legitimacy. But some variants of political philosophy have colonized the far broader field of political thinking and they have monopolized a different take on legitimacy.
They seek to determine which aspects of such thinking are considered to be legitimate and valid in the study of political thought and which should be marginalized or ignored. The space left to other genres and approaches has been constricted because a different discipline, philosophy, has crowded out other significant ways of theorizing about political thinking, often in a manner ill-suited to the study of politics and the political. I am minded of a talk I gave many years ago in North Carolina, at the end of which two senior faculty A. Appropriating the locus of ultimate decision making in space and time, including determining, parcelling out and regulating domains and boundaries of competence among social spheres.
B. The distribution of material and symbolic goods in and across societies.
C. The mobilization or withholding of public support in a community.
D. The organization of the social complexities through which social stability or conflict and disruption are manufactured.
E. Policy-making and option-selection for collectivities.
F. The wielding of power (which cuts across the above five categories) The archetypal thought-practice cutting across those features is the decision: a practice intended to secure finality in collective affairs, whether for the short or long term. Indeed, the quest for finality in social affairs is at the heart of the political, though it is always an elusive one. It invariably slips through our grasp but we reach out for such illusory finalities time and again.
When I use a word', Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.' 'The question is', said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.' 'The question is', said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master-that's all.'
That need for semantic control, sometimes arrogant, sometimes desperate, is at the heart of the political. Humpty Dumpty sought to trump the many meanings words carry by the conferral of his meaning, indicating that Politics, like ideology, is a word with a reputational problem, but it is nevertheless central to our lives. When people talk about anti-politics this makes as much sense as talking about anti-economics or anti-psychology.
Almost every social situation has a political element, though its relative weight may be heavier or lighter from instance to instance. The Russian attempt to control parts of the Ukraine is patently political; giving a university talk such as this may be less obviously so, but it ticks many boxes of a political thoughtpractice: it attempts to persuade, though rarely to threaten -and it may fail to do so; it involves order and a stable situation; it establishes a temporary pecking order of whose voice should be heard. stipulative view of the political, one that a political theory of political thinking needs to correct.
I have only time to illustrate the approach I advocate by referring to one of the six features of thinking politically, the arrogance of politics. This refers not only to the hubris associated with the political but to the second meaning of arrogance: To appropriate, assume or claim without justification. Selfassuming, self-anointing, self-privileging, self-reflexivity are fundamental characteristics of the political and they bypass rather than challenge ethical considerations. I have illustrated that with the aborted sacrifice of Isaac by
Abraham because it is obedience to a command that requires no justification.
That command is a pure political act that brooks no dissent or reason and it has no appeal to a higher order. Recall Napoleon grabbing the crown from the Pope and crowning himself. Or note the Islamic scholar Abul A'ala Mawdudi:
'God is the absolute sovereign and has absolute authority to issue whatever command He might will.' Crucially, it is not the wise contents of God's ordinances that demand obedience; a believer obeys 'simply because they are requires constant renewal as a feature of the political, the temporal locus of the finality drive, the practice of instituting a temporal boundary. It is a social and architectural necessity, a pure morphological requirement, without which human beings cannot live an organized or meaningful life. If God does not exist, the very notion of finality that anchors the political would have been undermined from the earliest days of civilization. Sovereignty is part of that idea but it is a temporal sovereignty that precedes a spatial one: A 'firstsubsequent' dimension, where temporality is logically prior to spatiality.
Hobbes and Bossuet refer to the sovereign's quality of making the law while being free from it, and that is just another expression of temporal primacy: the absence of being bound to a preceding will. There has to be, structurally, an agency whose decisions and competence allocations are ipso fact final.
Here then are some questions that a theory of political thinking should How can we convey that all human activity and communication has a political dimension, whether dense or sparse, and that all practice is theoryrich?
How can we account for the relationship between the fluidity of political thought and its containment and patterning, a task that requires us to take into account decontestation and the control over political and public language?
All this is not about the replacement of established approaches to political thought but of complementing them, allowing the kind of questions that have been muted as a result of the dominance of ethical and analytical political philosophy and that seek to recover the political as an field where crucial kinds of human thought and action occur, and which we as students of society and as political theorists must take very seriously indeed. I have only been able to scratch the surface in my talk, but much of the rest is in my book,
and in the work of other scholars who are beginning to take that path.
